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Abstract: Based on fixed point theory, this paper proposes a simple but efficient method for image 
integrity authentication, which is different from Digital Signature and Fragile Watermarking. By 
this method, any given image can be transformed into a fixed point of a well-chosen function, which 
can be constructed with periodic functions. The authentication can be realized due to the fragility of 
the fixed points. The experiments show that “Fixed Point Image” performs well in security, transparence, 
fragility and tampering localization. 
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1 Introduction 
Among the current image integrity authentication techniques [1], Digital Signature [2] is the 
most wildly used method, because the asymmetric-key algorithm guarantees the security of Digital 
Signature. But this method is not suitable for tampering localization, and the additional signature 
information must be transmitted along with the original image. Fragile Watermarking [3] is the 
hottest research area in authentication. Its outstanding features are transparence and tampering 
localization, but its security is still a problem.  
Recently, a new authentication scheme based on fixed point theory has been given in literature 
[4]. It has the same performance as Fragile Watermarking in tampering localization, but better 
performance in transparence. Since its authentication process can be considered a symmetric-key 
algorithm, we believe that its security is higher than most of Fragile Watermarking methods, but 
lower than Digital Signature methods. In the authentication scheme based on fixed point theory, the 
original image is transformed into a fixed point image by a well-chosen function, and the 
authentication is then implemented based on the fragility of the fixed point image. Some basic 
requirements were put forward in literature [4] for finding suitable functions, and a feasible function 
named Gaussian Convolution and Deconvolution (GCD) function was constructed in
M N
Z  (the 
M N dimensional integer space). The fixed point images generated by a GCD function are very 
fragile, and have good localization ability for tampering. But unfortunately, there are few scattered 
and non-tampered points which may be wrongly marked as suspicious points.  
In this paper, a new function is constructed in Z (the one dimensional integer space). This 
function has better performance in calculation, and its fixed point images can localize the tampering 
accurately in pixel-level. In fact, the localization result and the real tampering position differ with at 
most one pixel’s distance. 
2 Integrity authentication scheme based on fixed point theory 
 For a given mapping :f D D , if there exists x D  such that ( )f x x , then x  is called 
a fixed point of the mapping f  in the space D . In literature [4], x  is considered as an image, f  an 
operation on images, and D  a space of images; in order to make sure that f is suitable for 
authentication, the author proposed three basic requirements: (1) for fragility, the function ( )kf   
must have sparse fixed points for any given secret key k ; (2) for calculation, any image can reach a 
fixed point of ( )kf   after several iterations; (3) for transparence, the original image and its fixed 
point image should not be distinguished visually. 
For a fixed point image of f , if it is tampered, then after the calculation performed with f , the 
tampered image will move to a nearest fixed point. In general, these two fixed point images are not 
the same, so how to make the difference between them as small as we expect is a challenging 
problem. The GCD function can ensure that most of the false localizations happen near the 
tampered areas, and only few scattered and non-tampered points may be wrongly marked as 
suspicious points.   
In order to make the localization more accurate, we discuss the integrity authentication problem 
in D  Z  based on fixed point theory. Here, we consider x  as a single pixel of an image, f  an 
operation on pixels. This new function f should satisfy three similar requirements for its fixed 
points: proper sparsity, feasibility of calculation, and good transparence. 
Let’s consider a simple function: 
 ( ) cos( )f x x R x  ,                                                            (1) 
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Obviously, this function has fixed points in Z , and these fixed points can be figured out easily. 
Specially, there are 86 uniformly dispersed fixed points in 256 {0,1, ,255}Z  . 
 The function (1) is simple but not good enough for authentication in security, fragility and 
transparence. Taking into account the environment information, we construct the following new 
function. Let I  be a gray image of sizeM N , x  be the pixel value at ( , )s t  of an image I  , and
1 8, ,x x  be the pixel values of the 8 closest neighbors of ( , )s t  (see Fig. 1).  Let H  and
1 12, ,K K  be random matrices with the same size as I , the elements of H  taking values in
(0.5,1]  and the elements of 1 12, ,K K  taking values in 0,2 . In addition, we suppose that at 
least half of 1 8, ,K K  are equal to zero. For simplicity, let ( , )sth H s t ,
 1 12( , ), , ( , )st K s t K s tK   and 1 8( , , , , , , )
T
st x x s t M NX  , then for each position ( , )s t , 
we define the function using for authentication as follows: 
 , , ( ) cosst st sth st st stf x x R h x    X K K X ,   256x  .             (2) 
We can give the functions for other pixels in the similar way. Specially, if there are some points that 
lie outside I , we specify the pixel values a constant, such as 0 . 
 
Fig. 1. The eight neighbors of the pixel x . 
In 256Z , the proportion of the fixed points of the function , , ( )st st sthf X K  will decrease as sth  
increases, which results in bad quality of the fixed point images at the same time. Considering the 
transparence, we set the upper-bound of sth  less than1. The elements of the matrices 1 12, ,K K  
take random values in  0,2  because cos( )  is a periodic function with period 2 , and they are 
introduced to enhance the randomness of the fixed points of , , ( )st st sthf X K . In addition, the 
parameters , , ,s t M N  can effectively detect some copy attacks and geometric attacks.    
 For 1 8, ,x x , we give the constraint that at least half of 1 8, ,K K  are equal to zero. The 
reason is that if the number of non-zero parameters is less than 4 , then x  and 1 8, ,x x  will interact 
with each other in calculation, which bring difficulties for finding fixed point images. Under the 
constraint on 1 8, ,K K , selecting proper way for point-by-point calculation can make the 
influences among x  and 1 8, ,x x  to be one-way influences, which is very important for practical 
computation. For example, let
5 8, ,K K  be equal to zero (the zero matrix), if we calculate from 
left to right and from top to bottom, then we will find in calculation process that the environments
1 4, ,x x  can affect the generation of x (the corresponding fixed point of x ), while x  can affect the 
generation of 5 8, ,x x (the corresponding fixed points of 5 8, ,x x ). Similarly, if 1 4, ,K K are 
equal to zero, we can calculate from bottom to top and from right to left. Besides, at least one of
1 8, ,K K  should be non-zero, which is for detecting collage attack. 
 In this model, the fragility can be considered as a probability problem. Suppose that
5 8, ,K K  are equal to zero. If the fixed point x  is tampered, then the modified value is no longer 
necessarily a fixed point; the same situation may occur for 5 8, ,x x . For each position ( , )s t , 
denote by 0p  the ratio of the number of fixed points of , , ( )st st sthf X K to 256 , and by 1 8, ,p p  the 
corresponding ratios for the 8 closest neighbors of ( , )s t . Notice that ip  ( 0,1, ,8i   ) is the 
probability for a pixel value to be a fixed point at the concerned position (the position ( , )s t  or one 
of its 8 neighbors).  If the fixed point x  is tampered into 'x , the probability for 'x   and 5 8, ,x x  
to remain fixed points (at the corresponding positions) is 0 5 8p p p . Notice that although 
introducing more neighbors can make the fixed point images more fragile (cf. the analysis above), in 
order to locate tampering accurately, we only introduce eight neighbors
1 8, ,x x . The strategy will 
be proven very satisfying by simulation. 
3 Algorithm and Simulation 
 For a pixel value 
0x  at position ( , )s t  of an image I , we can find a fixed point of , , ( )st st sthf X K  
after several iterations, but the fixed point may not be the nearest fixed point to 0x , and it may jump 
out of
256 . Considering the transparence and the value range of gray images, we transform the 
iteration problem into a problem of integer optimization as follows:    
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                                     (3) 
The constraint
0 0[ 3, 3]x x x    is introduced to simplify the optimization calculation, so that we 
can get the suitable fixed point by exhaustive search algorithm. We choose 
0 0[ 3, 3]x x   
because 
at most 3 integers can satisfy cos( ) 0.5   in an interval of length 2 / 3 , which means that the 
maximal distance between
0x  and the fixed points of , , ( )st st sthf X K  is no more than 3. 
3.1 Algorithm.  
1) The sender and the receiver establish the secret key.  
2) For a given image I , the sender generates H  and 1 12, ,K K  with the secret key, and 
calculates the fixed point of every pixel to get the fixed point image J , and then send J  to 
the receiver over a public channel.   
3) For the received image 'J , the receiver generates parameters similarly with the secret key, 
and verifies whether cos( ) 0.5st st sth y  K Y  for all 'y J  , for each position ( , )s t . 
If the inequality fails for some points in 'J , we mark them to be suspicious points; 
otherwise we conclude that 'J J .  
3.2 Key generation scheme and Security.   
For each pixel value x  at position ( , )s t of an image I , if x  is a fixed point corresponding to x , 
it is impossible to figure out sth  and stK  because of the truncating operation on cos( ) . So the 
above algorithm can be considered as a kind of symmetric key algorithm, and the security depends 
only on the size of the key space.  
The key generation scheme is based on a random number generator. We choose the following 
linear congruential generator [5] to produce random numbers:  
  1 (4 1) 2 1 mod(2 )
m
n nx a x b     , 0n  ,                                (4) 
where 0 , ,x a b , andm  take positive integers. The random sequence 0 1, ,x x can be standardized 
into a uniform distribution on any given interval, so that a random matrix in any interval can be 
generated with a set of parameters 0( , , , )x a b m . Then the key can be constructed with 13 sets of 
parameters 0( , , , ) : 1, ,13i i i ix a b m i   , and the key space is big enough for practical use if these 
parameters are not too small. For example, if the elements of the key take random integers in
[10,50] , the key space is larger than
4 9 19241 2  .   
3.3 Transparence.   
The Peak Sign-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is selected as the similarity measure between an image 
and its fixed point images; 2000 images are selected for simulation from the image database 
FREEFOTO [6].  Fig. 2 shows the simulation result, where the elements of the key take random 
integers in[10,90]  and the quality of the fixed point images is adjusted via the upper bound of
( , )sth H s t . 
Compared with the experiment results in literature [4], the fixed point images in this paper 
perform less well in transparence. The reason is that the sparsity of the fixed points is harder to 
control in Z  than that in
M N
Z . Happily, both methods get higher PSNR value than most of the 
fragile or semi-fragile watermarking methods; when the upper bound of ( , )H s t is less 0.7, even the 
minimum value of PSNR is larger than 51 dB. Additionally, the PSNR value can be adjusted freely 
in a continuous interval in both methods.  
 
Fig. 2.  Test for transparence. 
3.4 Fragility.  
By the discussion in Section 2, we know that fixed point images can detect the common attacks 
such as image processing, JPEG compression, etc., because these attacks significantly modify the 
fixed point images and these modified images are almost impossible to pass the integrity 
authentication. In Fig. 3, the Rewriting attack experiment demonstrates the fragility of a fixed point 
image and the security of our scheme at the same time. The image of size 400×600 is selected from 
the image database FREEFOTO; the upper bound of ( , )H s t  is equal to 0.52; the elements of the 
key take random integers in[10,90]; the suspicious pixels are marked with white dots. 
 
Fig. 3. Test for fragility security. (a) is the original image; (b) is the fixed point image with 
PSNR=57.3503 dB; (c) is the Rewriting attack with known original image, where the upper 
bound of ( , )H s t  is equal to 0.51, and PSNR=58.8717 dB; (d) is the corresponding 
authentication results. 
3.5 Tampering localization.  
Using the same original image, we test the tampering localization ability against some 
common local attacks, where the tampered areas are marked with rectangles. Fig. 4 shows the 
comparison of our tampering localization results (Fig.4 (c, d)) and the result of the method in 
literature [4] (Fig.4 (b)). We see that the fixed point images in this paper perform better in tampering 
localization as we discussed in Section 2. In addition, the attack responses (Fig.4 (d)) are stronger 
when the upper bound of ( , )H s t  is higher.  
 
Fig. 4. Test for tampering localization. (a) shows some common localized modifications, 
where A is the Salt and Pepper noise attack; B is the Gaussian noise attack; C is the Median 
filter attack; D is the Gaussian filter attack; E is the Image enhancement attack; F is the Copy 
attack from an another image; G is the Copy attack from itself; H is the Covering attack with 
a constant; I is the Collage attack from an another fixed point image generated with the same 
parameters; J is adding illegal logo; (b) shows the authentication result of the method in 
literature [4], and the PSNR value of the fixed point image is equal to 58.5374 dB; (c) shows 
the result of the method in this paper, where the upper bound of ( , )H s t  is equal to 0.512, 
and PSNR=58.4268 dB; (d) shows the result when the upper bound of ( , )H s t  is equal to 1, 
and PSNR=50.9151 dB.   
Note. For the Collage attack in the area I (Fig.4 (a)), the authentication results (Fig.4 (c, d)) show up 
as hollow squares, which are caused by the selecting method of environment information in (2). It is 
worth noticing that this phenomenon can be used to distinguish the Collage attack from other 
attacks. 
4 Conclusions 
We have proposed a new method for image integrity authentication, based on fixed point 
theory. The proposed method can deal with gray images with simple algorithm, fast calculation, 
high security and high-precision localization. We find that it is more suitable for the “Trustworthy 
Digital Camera” since it can efficiently treat a lot of images and it can also be easily generalized to 
color image authentication. 
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